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International economic reform 
and income distribution 
William R. Cline* 
I 
The distribution of world income 
A major goal of the New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO) is to achieve a more 
egalitarian world-wide distribution of income. 
The best evidence available suggests that the 
size distribution of world income (in principle, 
with the family as the unit) is as shown in table 
1, which is based on purchasing-parity ex-
change rates estimated by Kravis and asso-
ciates, and on national income distribution 
data compiled by the World Bank. The first 
estimate (Kravis et al ) assumes complete 
equality within countries, while the second 
(Cline) incorporates information on income 
distribution within the countries (the data 
refer to 68 developed and developing coun-
tries, excluding the socialist bloc). 
Clearly, the world distribution is highly 
unequal . Indeed, the world economy is slightly 
more unequal in distribution than the most 
unequal of national economies (such as Brazil 
and Colombia). Moreover, the relative (and of 
course absolute) per capita income gaps be-
tween countries have been rising over the past 
several decades.1 
*Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution. 
] S e e Simon Kuznets, "The Gap: Concepts, Measure-
ment and Trends" , in G. Ranis, The Gap Between Rich 
and Poor Nations, Macmillan, 1972. 
It is clear 'from table 1, however, that 
much of the world's inequality stems from 
unequal distribution within countries. As 
shown by the first column (which abstracts 
from within-country inequality), the share of 
the world's poorest 40% in world income 
would be twice as high if incomes were equal 
within countries. 
Table 1 
ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION 
OF WORLD INCOME, 1972 




Lowest 40% of recipients 8.4 4.1 
Next 50% 58.0 45.6 
Top 10% 33.6 50.2 
Gini coefficient n.a. 0.67 
Sources: I. Kravis, A. Heston and R. Summers, "Real 
G D P Per Capita for More than One Hundred 
Countries", The Economic Journal, 88 (350), 
June 1978, pp. 125-142, and William R. Cline, 
"Commodity Prices and the World Distribution 
of Income", mimeographed, 1979. 
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II 
Development strategy and distribution 
By now it should be clear to all that unequal 
income distribution within a developing coun-
try is neither a prerequisite nor an inevitable 
consequence of growth. Although the Kuznets 
inverse-U curve (relating income concentra-
tion to per capita income level) has been 
confirmed as a statistical pattern,¿ it has much 
lower explanatory power (unless enhanced 
by other, policy-endogenous variables) than 
does the ' 'patterns of industrial growth" con-
cept (relating industrial patterns to per capita 
income). The contrasting examples of Taiwan 
and Korea on the one hand and Brazil and 
Mexico on the other are vivid evidence that 
rapid growth may occur under conditions of 
equal or unequal income distribution. 
Political conditions and development 
strategy set the course of income distribution. 
The single most important factor distinguish-
ing the Taiwan-Korea model from the Brazil-
Mexico model has probably been the dif-
ference in initial asset distribution, primarily 
because of the presence of thorough-going 
land reform in the first case and its absense in 
the second. This difference in initial conditions 
(determined by differing political conditions) 
has been exacerbated by contrasting develop-
men t strategies; labour-intensive (with manu-
factured exports) versus capital-intensive, 
respectively. 
Transnational corporations. What about 
the role of foreign forces in determining inter-
nal income distribution? About the only argu-
ment that the inequality of the less developed 
countries (LDCs) may be blamed on outsiders 
rests on the idea that the transnational corpo-
rations (TNCs) apply only capital-intensive 
technology. While there is some evidence that 
TNCs use more capital-intensive technology 
2Montek Ahluwalia, "Income Distribution and De-
velopment: Some Stylized Facts", American Economic 
Review, Nashville, Tenn., May 1976. 
than domestic firms,3 it does not follow that 
foreign investment makes domestic income 
more concentrated. Indeed, it should raise 
labour's share in the economy (by increasing 
capital availability and lowering the local 
return on capital), and only under improbable 
assumptions (preemption of local investment 
by foreign, so that total capital stock does not 
rise, plus a more skewed structure of employee 
payments than by domestic firms) is the TNC 
likely to worsen domestic income distribution. 
Basic Human Needs. While LDC inequal-
ity is basically homegrown, external forces 
currently seek to reduce it. Thus, donor coun-
tries and international agencies have adopted 
an emphasis on income distribution in their 
lending programmes, and programmes for 
Basic Human Needs (BHN) are in fashion. The 
change in style is welcome, after decades of 
donor emphasis on growth alone, but the 
politics are delicate. Developing countries 
fear that BHN is a device for intervening in 
their domestic affairs, while as for the donors, 
some of the underlying motives are open to 
suspicion, since BHN (as well as "human 
rights") can be used as a slogan by those who 
oppose aid altogether. The economics of BHN 
are also uncertain, given the difficulty of 
distinguishing between mere maintenance of 
consumption and "investment" in human 
beings, but on balance the swing towards 
BHN is very likely appropriate in the light of 
economic criteria if reasonable equity weights 
and discount rates are applied. There is a need 
for flexibility in implementation; where an 
entire country is poor and distribution is rela-
tively even, focus on growth alone will proba-
bly be more socially efficient than limitation 
of aid to the types of projects typically found 
on a BHN checklist. 
3See Samuel A. Morley and Gordon W. Smith, "Limit-
ed Search and the Technology Choices of Multinational 
Firms in Brazil", Quarterly Journal of Economics, New 
York, 1977, pp. 263-287, 
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Within the NIEO context, an income dis-
tribution (orBHN) focus of donor programmes 
is essential, because resource transfers are so 
limited that they must be concentrated on the 
poorest if they are to have much impact on 
world equity. Moreover, more funds are likely 
to be mobilized if donor legislatures believe 
they are going for equity-oriented programmes 
("don't tax the poor at home to help the rich 
abroad"). For these reasons it is important to 
dislodge the "sovereignty" issue from the 
unfortunate predominance it has held in the 
United Nations and other forums. 
Latin America, poverty and concessional 
aid. One of the most difficult aspects of North-
South relations is the issue of whether con-
cessional aid flows should go to Latin America 
to finance projects that help to correct income 
What would be the potential impact of NIEO 
reforms on the world distribution of income? 
Commodities 
(a) Price increases. Commodity policy has 
been the most prominent element on the 
LDC list of NiEO demands. To take an extreme 
version first, what would happen to the world 
distribution of income if somehow the LDCs 
were able to increase radically the prices of 
their raw material exports, repeating the OPEC 
experience? Although that scenario is highly 
improbable because of demand elasticities, 
supplier fragmentation, and the importance 
of industrial country suppliers, the question 
has considerable interest in the abstract. "Un-
equal exchange" theorists such as Emmanuel4 
hold that the route to greater international 
equity is through improved terms of trade for 
4A. Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A study of the 
imperialism of Trade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1972). 
inequality (development of low-income re-
gions, for example). The hard reality is that 
concessional resources are so scarce, and most 
of the African and Asian population is so much 
poorer than that of Latin America, that there 
is little justification for concessional aid to 
most countries of the latter region. Market-
related loans from the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) al-
ready carry an element of concessional ity (their 
maturities are longer and interest rates lower 
than are available in the private capital market), 
and they are the appropriate vehicles for 
middle-income recipients. As a matter of donor 
policy, however, it is important that even these 
flows be for equity-oriented programmes, if 
the North is to have an influence in improving 
equity in the South. 
LDCs, and there is little doubt that much of 
the initial LDC enthusiasm for a Common 
Fund for Commodities stemmed from the 
hope that it could be used as a device to gener-
alize the OPEC result to other commodities. 
A recent study by the present author5 
simulates the impact on world income distribu-
tion of the quadrupling of prices for several 
LDC commodity exports (sugar, coffee, cocoa, 
tea, natural rubber, cotton, jute, iron ore, 
bauxite, petroleum, copper, and tin), using 
1972 as a base year and assuming totally price-
inelastic demand. The results are not encour-
aging for "commodity power" as the road to 
global equality, since these price increases 
raise the share of the world's poorest 40% from 
4.15% of world income to 4.28%, assuming no 
changes in intra-country distribution. If the 
equalizing assumption is made that for each 
country net gains accrue to the poorest 40% 
5William R. Cline, "Commodity Prices and the World 
Distribution of Income", (Washington, D.C., mimeo-
graphed, 1979). 
Il l 
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and net losses are at the expense of the richest 
20%, then the quadrupling of commodity 
prices raises the world income share of the 
poorest 40% from 4.15% (the Gini coefficients 
are 0.673, 0.669, and 0.658 for the base year 
and the two respective simulations). 
The ineffectiveness of even extreme com-
modity price increases for equalizing world 
income reflects the fact that (a) production is 
dispersed among rich and poor countries, and 
(b) trade in commodities accounts for only a 
small fraction of world income. More generally, 
the simulation results suggest that "world 
equi ty" is not a sound basis for supporting 
higher commodity prices. 
(b) Price stabilization. Commodity price 
stabilization holds more promise as a NIEO 
reform, since it could add to world income by 
providing for smoother adjustment in both 
industrial and developing countries. Behrman6 
has estimated that over the decade 1963-1972, 
the presence of buffer stocks limiting price 
fluctuations to 15% around the trend levels 
would have added a total of US$ 15 billion to 
United States income by facilitating policies 
of fuller employment through the avoidance of 
inflationary shocks from commodity import 
prices. His study also estimates the static 
welfare gains to LDCs from commodity price 
stabilization, although the unestimated dy-
namic welfare gains associated with more 
stable domestic macroeconomic conditions (in 
LDCs), as well as gains from the stimulus to 
commodity investment caused by the reduc-
tion in uncertainty, are probably far larger. 
Commodity price stabilization would 
benefit both rich and poor countries and would 
therefore increase world income, but it proba-
bly would not redistribute it to any significant 
degree. In March 1979 the industrial and 
developing countries agreed in principle on a 
Common Fund for commodity price stabiliza-
tion. Whether the Fund will adopt binding 
decisions, and whether its presence will lead 
to more commodity agreements, remains to be 
seen. Nevertheless, the prospective Common 
Jere R. Behrman, International Commodity Ar-
rangements: An Evaluation of the VNCTAD Integrated 
Commodity Programme (Washington, D.C, Overseas De-
velopment Council, 1977). 
Fund represents an important tangible result 
(or near-result) of the tortuous North-South 
negotiations of the last five years. 
Concessional aid. An important potential 
instrument for redistributing world income is 
concessional assistance. Out of a world income 
of approximately US$ 5 trillion, the world's 
poorest 40% receive about 4% or US$ 200 
billion. In 1977, the OECD countries provided 
US$ 15 billion in concessional aid (OPEC 
provided another US$ 5.7 billion), or 0.31% 
of their GNP. If the OECD countries met the 
United Nations target of 0.7% of GNP, and if 
the additional US$ 19 billion in aid were 
channelled wholly to the world's poorest 40%, 
the latter would obtain approximately a 10% 
increase in their income (it should be noted 
that this increment in the income of the poor 
would be about the same size as that obtained 
under the highly implausible quadrupling of 
commodity prices with gains focused on the 
poor and losses on the rich). 
Political realities do not favour a massive 
rise in concessional aid, however. With slow 
growth, high inflation and unemployment in 
industrial countries, legislatures are more 
inclined to cut down budgets. 
Trade reform. The recently completed 
Tokyo Round of trade negotiations represents 
an important achievement for the developing 
countries, since world tariffs facing their prod-
ucts will fall by about 25%. Rather than em-
phasizing that this cut is lower than the overall 
average (about 33%), LDC policy-makers 
should recognize that this result of the nego-
tiations represents a considerable "free ride" 
(for which they made few concessions them-
selves). Other parts of the negotiations are less 
favourable, however: a new deal between the 
United States administration and the textile 
industry could cut the growth of LDC quotas 
from 6% to 2% per year in many items, because 
of the need to mollify the industry in the face 
of lower tariffs on imports from Japan and 
Europe, and the new codes on safeguards and 
countervailing duties also have potentially 
injurious implications for the LDCs ("selective 
safeguards" might be used as a club to force 
voluntary quotas, while obligatory phasing out 
of export subsidies may be inconsistent with 
efficient shadow pricing of foreign exchange). 
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The need for trade reform goes far beyond 
the liberalization accomplished in the Tokyo 
Round. The régime of textile quotas is not the 
only restrictive aspect of North-South trade. 
Safeguard protection of shoes and television 
sets and various forms of restrictions on steel, 
shipbuilding and electronics plague the 
trading system. Reform would call for elimi-
nation of those restrictions, but in practice 
the LDCs will be fortunate if even a standstill 
on protection is achieved. 
Protection makes the world distribution 
of income more unequal by limiting the pro-
cess of factor price equalization through trade. 
It may keep distribution more equal in indus-
trial countries by boosting the demand for 
labour; Balassa7 shows that the labour content 
per billion dollars of industrial country imports 
from LDCs is higher than that per billion 
dollars of exports to LDCs. But even in indus-
trial countries there are offsetting factors: 
protection against LDCs limits the supply of 
low-cost imports, probably affecting low-
income consumers the most,8 while for LDCs, 
foreign protection (and their own for that 
matter) concentrates income distribution by 
skewing demand for production away from 
labour-intensive goods towards capital-inten-
sive goods. Among LDCs, freer trade world-
wide may ironically be income-concentrating 
in the short run, because it is the middle-
income countries (not the low income ones) 
that will capture most of the increase in mar-
kets. 
As for tariff preferences, the trade reform 
long advocated by UNCTAD, the consensus 
is that they have added Httle to LDC exports 
because of the ceilings and exclusions which 
accompany them, and that moreover the politi-
cal context makes any significant future lib-
eralization of preferences highly unlikely. 
In sum, then the "reform" of trade achieved 
in practice will be simply the maintenance of 
at least the current degree of openness in 
world markets. By minimizing the chance of 
7Bela Balassa, "The Changing International Division 
of Labor in Manufactured Goods" (Washington, D.C., 
mimeographed, 1979). 
8William R. Cline, Imports and Consumer Prices; A 
Survey Analysis {Washington, D.C., American Retail 
Federation, 1978). 
trade wars, the new non-tariff-barrier codes 
and the tariff negotiations of the Tokyo Round 
should help achieve this "reform". 
Debt relief. At the end of 1976 the external 
public debt of the developing countries 
amounted to US$ 160 billion.9 In the initial 
stages of the NIEO discussions, some Third 
World spokesmen advocated generalized debt 
relief as a means of increasing international 
equity. It is widely accepted by now, however, 
that generalized debt relief would be counter-
productive for middle-income countries, be-
cause it would jeopardize their credit ratings 
and dry up capital inflows. At the same time, 
public concern about the danger of a rash of 
debt defaults, with a consequent collapse in 
industrial country financial centres, has grad-
ually subsided, as it has become evident that 
after adjustment for inflation and in view of 
higher export earnings, the LDC debt problem 
is not much worse today than in the early 1970s 
(before the massive borrowings of 1974-1975). 
Two issues remain. The first is the danger 
of debt servicing problems (such as those 
which have recently arisen in Zaire, Peru and 
Turkey). The second is the possibility of debt 
cancellation for poorer countries, as a means 
of aid. International negotiations have 
achieved a modest breakthrough on "retro-
active terms adjustment" for poor LDCs, and 
less successful attempts have been made at 
defining "features" of debt profiles warranting 
rescheduling by middle-income countries. 
For world income distribution, the cancel-
lation of debts owed by poor countries to donor 
governments represents a somewhat promising 
instrument. Approximately US$ 2.4 billion 
annually could be transferred to poor coun-
tries in this way if donors did not make cor-
responding cuts in new aid. (The agreements 
so far fall far short of this potential, because 
they are limited to a minor list of "least de-
veloped" countries.) In general, the potential 
for world income equalization through debt 
relief is comparable to that of a modest rise in 
global aid flows. Refinancing facilities for 
middle-income countries in trouble under 
specific "features" would have little impact 
on world income distribution, because new 
9World Bank, Annual Report 1978. 
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loans would most likely be at market-related 
interest rates, the supply of concessional funds 
being limited. 
Some analysts emphasize the danger that 
high LDC indebtedness will spell stagnation 
over the next few years, as LDCs (usually 
middle-income) reduce growth in order to 
keep debt manageable.10 However, slower 
future growth represents the price paid for 
faster growth during the world recession in 
1974 and 1975. From 1973 to 1975, when 
O E C D growth fell from 5.9% to -0 .9%, non-
oil-LDC growth fell only from 7.3% to 4.1%. 
The decline might have been much greater 
without heavy borrowing to finance current 
account deficits.11 With a high time discount 
rate, higher earlier growth was probably a 
correct strategy, but it should come as no 
surprise that the implication was lower sub-
sequent growth. Until growth at the centre 
reaccelerates, the production possibility 
frontier of the LDCs will remain on a lower 
time path than before, and attempts to achieve 
more rapid growth (or maintain earlier rapid 
growth rates) will cause worsening external 
imbalance. The problem will only be resolved 
by reacce le ration at the centre, or failing that, 
a turn a new strategy of growth that is less 
dependen t on external factors (if such an 
alternative exists). 
The international monetary system. A 
decade ago there was considerable hope that 
monetary reform could be meshed with aid 
to developing countries (the SDR/aid "link"). 
Triffin and others12 have accused the present 
exchange-reserve system of being discrimi-
natory against LDCs because their currencies 
are not used as reserve currencies and they do 
not enjoy seigniorage. In principle, therefore, 
monetary reform might help to equalize the 
distribution of income among countries. 
The prospects for significant aid flows 
through the linkage of SDRs to development 
assistance are poor. Relatively small amounts 
of SDRs are likely to be created over the next 
few years. If a "link" were created, it would 
luAlbeit Fishlow, "Debt Remains a Problem", Foreign 
Policy, 30 (Spring 1978). 
UJ. Holsen and J. Waelbroeck, "The Less Developed 
Countries and the International Monetary Mechanism", 
American Economic Review, May 1976. 
have to be focused solely on the poorest coun-
tries in order to be most effective for redis-
tributive purposes, yet LDC politics (as shown 
by the LDC proposals in the Committee of 
Twenty) would probably lead to allocation 
based on I M F quotas, which favour middle-
income LDCs. 
As for the premise that the reserve centres 
benefit from the current system, the extreme 
reluctance of Germany and Japan to allow 
others to hold their currencies as reserves 
suggests that by the time all factors (including 
payment of interest) are taken into account, 
the reserve centre's real seigniorage is nega-
tive. 
Flexibility versus fixity of exchange rates 
among industrial countries is another monetary 
reform issue affecting LDCs. There is growing 
recognition among LDCs that fixed exchange 
rates among industrial countries are not feasi-
ble and can lead to greater restrictions on trade 
and capital flows than a régime of flexible rates. 
Here there are few implications for world 
income distribution, however: whichever sys-
tem is better for the industrial economies 
will almost certainly also be better for L D C s 
because of derived benefits from faster growth 
at the centre. 
Technology transfer. Although hypotheti-
cally lower-cost transfer of technology would 
work towards redistribution of income from 
the North to the South, extreme "reforms" 
such as the undermining of patent rights within 
the industrial countries would dry up the flow 
of new inventions and reduce total real income. 
There is, ..however, considerable scope for 
increased LDC bargaining in the "bilateral 
monopoly" situation of TNCs versus LDCs. 
Andean Pact restrictions on royalty payments, 
and requirements of local content and owner-
ship, are examples, and some analysts contend 
that it is now generally the LDCs that have 
obtained the upper hand in bargaining (partly 
because of the "obsolescing bargain" whereby 
host bargaining power increases once the 
investment in sunk).13 
In Jan Tinbergen et al, RIO: Reshaping the Inter-
national Order. A Report to the Club of Rome (New York, 
E.P. Dutton, 1976). 
i aSee C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst, and Theodore 
H. Moran, American Multinationals and American 
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IV 
NIEO proposals: Summary 
A recent Overseas Development Council 
study14 contains quantitative estimates of the 
economic benefits and costs of several NIEO 
proposals. Table 2 summarizes these estimates. 
Achievement of the 0.7% of GNP aid target is 
the reform that would go the farthest towards 
reducing international inequality. Not only 
would this reform generate a larger net flow of 
benefits to LDCs, but also (a) the benefits 
would be focused on the poorest LDCs and 
(b) the cost would be borne by the industrial 
countries. Debt cancellation would be similar 
in effect but more modest in scope. 
Commodity price stabilization, grain re-
serves, and trade liberalization represent a 
second kind of reform, that benefits both 
industrial countries and LDCs (mainly middle-
income LDCs). These reforms would have a 
considerable effect on world economic growth 
(especially considering that the table's esti-
mates are understated for commodity stabiliza-
tion benefits to LDCs), although they would 
probably leave world income distribution un-
changed. 
A third category of reform is the new 
automatic aid mechanism, ranging from the 
SDR aid link and IMF gold sales to ocean 
resource revenues. Because of the acceptance 
of the 200 mile economic limit, most of the 
potential aid from ocean resources has already 
been given away. One of the more intriguing 
proposals for automatic aid is the restitution of 
tariffs collected to exporting LDCs, which 
would generate an estimated US$ 7 billion 
annually. Although these funds would go 
mainly to middle-income LDCs, they would 
contribute to world equity. 
Reviewing the whole range of reforms 
listed in table 2, however, and considering the 
Interests (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 
1978). 
14William R. Cline, Policy Alternatives for a New 
International Economic Order {New York, Praeger 
Publishers, 1979). 
political implausibility of many of them, it is 
clear that the programme of NIEO reforms 
cannot be expected to make a major impact in 
equalizing the world distribution of income. 
Even under the extremely optimistic assump-
tion of implementation of the whole set of 
N I E O reforms, the net benefit to LDCs would 
be only about US$ 30 billion annually, and 
even if most of this benefit were focused on 
the world's poorest 40%, the resulting increase 
in their real income would be only about 10%. 
Accelerated development within the 
LDCs holds much more potential for world 
equity than does a programme of redistribution 
through NIEO reforms. For the world's poorest 
40%, an acceleration of 1% per annum in LDC 
growth rates would give the same result after 
one decade as if the entire agenda of politically 
difficult NIEO reforms were implemented. 
T h e growth-based gains would be more per-
manent, because they would not rely on 
transfers from rich countries, and if internal 
L D C income redistribution policies were 
followed as well, the time span would be 
shorter than a decade, while the potential 
benefits for the poor could far exceed anything 
possible from international redistribution 
under even highly optimistic political assump-
tions. 
In summary, NIEO reforms can increase 
world efficiency (commodity price stabiliza-
tion, trade reform) and secure a modest im-
provement in world equity (aid target, debt 
relief, automatic aid mechanisms). However, 
the scope for world income equalization 
through NIEO reforms is small, especially if 
one is not optimistic about large increases in 
aid flows. Accordingly, the key to an improved 
world distribution of income lies in accelerated 
L D C growth and income redistribution within 
them. 
International economic management 
Although not on the NIEO agenda, prudent 
management of the international economy is 
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T a b l e 2 
E S T I M A T E S O F E C O N O M I C B E N E F I T S A N D C O S T S R E S U L T I N G F R O M 
A L T E R N A T I V E P O L I C I E S 
Potential policy 
Annual benefits to 
de ve 1 opi n g co un tr ie sa 
Amount Country 
(billions of US$) income level 
Annual benefits or 
costs to industrial 
countries8 




0.6 or more middle 4.6 benefit Assumes price stabilization, not 
price raising. Developing country 
benefit figure is for static gains. 
Omits benefits from increased cer-
tainty in planning and from stimulus 
to investment. Figure for industrial 
countries refers to macroeconomic 
stabilization benefits. 
Grain reserves 0.04 or food 0.09 or more Estimates for both developing and 
more importers benefit industrial countries are understated 
by exclusion of benefits from in-
creased certainty and macroeco-
nomic stabilization. (Industrial 






Benefits would include increased 
certainty in financial markets and 
smoother adjustment to payments 
problems in developing countries. 
Quantification difficult. 
Cancellation of debts 2.4 or 
of poor developing less 
countries 
low 2.4 or less 
cost 
Transfer to developing countries 
depends on extent to which aid 
through debt relief would be offset 
by reductions in direct aid. Such 
reductions would lower both bene-
fits to developing countries and 
cost to donors. 
Trade liberalization 
















Figures for developing countries 
refer to increase in annual exports: 
economic benefits would be lower, 
given resource costs of producing 
exports. Figures for industrial coun-
tries refer to liberalization of im-
ports from all sources; figures for 
tariffs refer to both static and dy-
namic benefits; figures for agricul-
tural non-tariff barriers and textiles 
refer to static benefits only. 1974 
data base. 
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Table 2 (cont. 1) 
Potential policy 
Annual benefits to 
developing countries8 
Amount Country 
(billions of US$) income level 
Annual benefits or 
costs to industrial 
countries* 
(billions of USI) 
Comments and qualifications 
Aid target 
0 ,7%of 'GNP 
0.5% of GNP 
15,3 or less low 
7 or less low 
0-15.3 cost 
0-7 cost 
The 0.5% target is more realistic 
than the 0.7% target, but either of 
them would require major revival 
of political will in support of aid. 
Real benefits to developing coun-
tries somewhat below nominal fig-
ures because of non-grant aid and 
aid tying. Real costs to donors below 
nominal figures to extent that un-
employed resources exist that 
would not be mobilized by in-
creased domestic spending pro-
grammes in the absence of in-
creased aid expenditures. Long-
run donor costs also may be much 
lower because of stimulus to world 
economic growth, and thus growth 
of donor countries, through effects 
such as increased supply of raw 
materials from developing coun-
tries and improved developing 




Oto 4 uncertain 0-4 cost 
Ocean resources 
Tariff repayment 




5 or less cost 
7 cost 
Tax on brain drain 







Measure has little prospect in the 
near term (see chapter 5 of Cline, 
Policy Alternatives..., op. cit.). If 
applied, a large share of benefits 
would accrue to middle-income 
developing countries under a for-
mula based on I M F quotas, al-
though distribution could be altered 
to favour low-income countries. 
Cost to industrial countries based 
on premise that net use of SDRs 
represents a claim on existing re-
sources, not on the creation of new 
world resources. 
See chapter 5. 
Estimate of current tariff collection s 
by industrial countries on imports 
from the developing countries. Re-
payments would accrue to devel-
oping country exporters, mainly 
middle-income countries. 
See chapter 5. 
See chapter 5. 
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Table 2 (conclusion) 
Potential policy 
Annual bene tits to 
developing countries8 
Amount Country 
(billions of US$) income level 
Annual benefits or 
costs to industrial 
countries8 
(billions of US») 
Comments and qualifications 
Liberalized 
migration 
very large all large internal Measure highly unliked politically. 
redistribution Would benefit both developing 
countries and industrial countries 
in aggregate, but would cause re-
distribution of income from workers 





ail Orders of magnitude unclear. The 
usual presumption is that devel-
oping countries would benefit and 
transnational firms from industrial 
countries would suffer from re-
duced monopoly power in inter-
national trade, but even this direc-
tion of change is uncertain. 
Source: William R. Cline, Policy Alternatives..., op. cit. 
a1976 base. 
ultimately the most likely source of success or 
failure in reducing world poverty. Since 1974, 
growth at the centre has been low, and growth 
rates on the periphery have been faltering as a 
result; similarly, the high inflation at the centre 
has resulted in "imported inflation" at the 
periphery. The energy shocks to the world 
economy have resurfaced in 1979 after re-
ceding temporarily, and traditional macroeco-
nomic policies at the centre have failed to 
resolve the problem of stagflation. 
The international economic outlook for the 
medium term is not bright: it is very far from the 
buoyant environment of most of the post-war 
period. In this context, the question of whether 
the industrial countries can break out of their 
stagflation impasse and resume high growth 
rates will probably have a much more profound 
influence on the economic prospects for the 
poor in LDCs than will the specific outcome of 
the NIEO negotiations. Similarly, the inven-
tiveness of the LDCs' policy response to the 
more hostile international economic environ-
ment will play a crucial role regarding the 
prospects of the world's poor. 
